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Global Surge in Dual-Use Export Controls (Fall 2025)
Governments around the world significantly tightened dual-use export regulations in September and October 2025. This wave of regulatory changes – spanning the United States, United Kingdom, European Union, and numerous other countries – reflects growing concern over sensitive technologies, sanctions evasion, and strategic security. Compliance professionals have witnessed an unprecedented convergence of stricter export control compliance measures targeting advanced semiconductors, quantum computing, artificial intelligence, aerospace components, and other technologies with both civilian and military applications. Türkiye’s strategic industries are watching these developments closely. As a NATO ally with a dynamic defense sector, Türkiye faces new legal obligations and supply chain pressures as global partners recalibrate 2025 export law changes to guard against unauthorized use of dual-use goods. In this context, Turkish authorities and companies must adapt swiftly to maintain export privileges and avoid penalties under the tightening regime.
United States: Expansive New Controls and Rapid Adjustments
In late September 2025, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) unveiled a landmark rule expanding list-based export controls. The “Affiliates Rule” (effective September 29, 2025) automatically extends existing U.S. license requirements to any foreign company 50% or more owned (directly or indirectly) by entities on the BIS Entity List or Military End-User List. This dramatic policy shift, aligning export controls with the U.S. Treasury’s sanctions “50% rule” concept, closed a loophole that previously allowed blacklisted firms to access U.S. dual-use items through legally distinct subsidiaries. Exporters are now under an affirmative duty to investigate ownership of their customers and partners; if a counterparty is majority-owned by a listed entity (even via multiple minority stakes), the exporter must treat the transaction as if the subsidiary itself were listed. U.S. companies scrambled to update screening protocols, knowing that high-tech sectors (e.g. semiconductors, aerospace, AI) and transactions involving China or Russia would face intense scrutiny.
Just weeks later, however, Washington signaled flexibility amid geopolitical negotiations. On November 1, 2025, the White House announced – as part of a deal with Beijing – a one-year suspension of the new affiliates rule’s implementation. Starting November 10, 2025, BIS planned to pause enforcement of these expanded controls for a year, easing immediate pressure on multinational companies entangled by the rule. While temporary, this pause illustrates the fluid nature of U.S. export policy as it balances national security concerns with diplomatic and industry feedback. It also underscores the need for Turkish firms dealing in U.S.-origin technology to stay nimble. BIS’s dual-use list and export rules can evolve quickly; companies in Türkiye must continuously monitor U.S. regulatory shifts, especially if they integrate U.S. components or software in their products or partner with U.S.-linked entities.
Apart from the affiliates rule, the U.S. also adjusted other controls affecting global supply chains. In September 2025, BIS moved to end special Validated End-User permissions for certain foreign chipmakers’ China facilities by year-end, signaling stricter oversight of advanced semiconductor exports. Additionally, during a brief U.S. government shutdown in October, BIS announced it would prioritize export license applications critical to national security or life safety, ensuring vital defense-related exports weren’t delayed. These fine-tunings, though procedural, highlight an American regulatory climate growing increasingly vigilant about where sensitive dual-use items ultimately end up. For Turkish companies – especially those importing U.S. technology or software – it is imperative to bolster internal controls and export control compliance programs to navigate the tightened U.S. rules. Non-compliance could result in denied exports or inclusion on BIS watchlists, jeopardizing Türkiye’s access to cutting-edge components.
Europe: Enhanced EU Lists, National Add-Ons, and Allied Alignment
European authorities intensified dual-use controls during this period through both EU-wide updates and national measures. On September 8, 2025, the European Commission adopted a Delegated Regulation to update the EU Dual-Use Control List (Annex I of Regulation 2021/821). This update – expected to enter into force by late 2025 – reaches beyond routine technical tweaks, expanding controls into emerging fields identified as critical for European security. Notably, the EU added new entries for quantum computing systems, including quantum computers and cryogenic components, reflecting the bloc’s concern over quantum technology’s strategic impact. The update also tightens controls on advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment and materials (such as extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography parts, epitaxial deposition tools, and certain electronic design tools), as well as advanced computing chips, high-temperature resistant coatings, and additive manufacturing equipment (e.g. 3D printers and specialized metal powders). By incorporating these items, the EU aligned its list with recent Wassenaar Arrangement recommendations and its own Economic Security Strategy, aiming to prevent cutting-edge European tech from bolstering adversary militaries. Compliance managers across Europe – and exporters in Türkiye who trade with the EU – are now updating their product classifications and licenses to reflect the EU dual-use updates in Annex I.
European nations also undertook their own regulatory refinements. The United Kingdom’s Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU) mirrored many EU moves, given UK law now maintains a “UK Strategic Export Control List” analogous to the EU list. In late 2025 the UK implemented list revisions adding controls on emerging technologies and issued guidance to British exporters on the new rules. London has been vocal about curbing exports of sensitive electronics and drone components that could fuel the Russia-Ukraine war. The UK also launched consultations to strengthen sanctions enforcement, proposing a settlement scheme and higher penalties for breaches – changes that signal a tougher stance on compliance. For Turkish firms dealing with UK partners or receiving UK-origin goods, this means more rigorous due diligence requirements and possibly longer license processing times as London weeds out risky transactions.
Some EU member states went even further. Sweden, for example, introduced a National Control List for Dual-Use Products and Technologies effective November 1, 2025, supplementing the EU list. The Swedish government added export licensing requirements for specific dual-use items not yet covered by Annex I, focusing on areas of “rapid technological development and growing security significance.” This Swedish list specifically targets exports of advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment, certain high-performance integrated circuits for AI and quantum computing, complete quantum computers and related components, and sophisticated 3D printing (additive manufacturing) systems. By amending its national ordinance on dual-use items to append this list, Sweden took a proactive stance against unregulated tech transfers. The inclusion of those categories – semiconductors, quantum, AI, and additive manufacturing – aligns with the West’s broader prioritization of emerging tech in export controls. It also reflects Sweden’s response to geopolitical realities (as it moves toward NATO membership) and acknowledges that EU-level lists sometimes lag behind technological advances. For Türkiye, Sweden’s move is noteworthy: as a fellow Wassenaar Arrangement participant, Turkey might consider similar targeted controls to protect technologies vital to defense.
Elsewhere in Europe, Norway and Switzerland kept pace with the tightening trend. Norway, though outside the EU, traditionally aligns its dual-use list with EU regulations under the European Economic Area framework. In September 2025, Oslo updated its export control regulation to harmonize with the EU’s latest dual-use list changes and continued to strictly enforce bans on transfers that could aid Russia’s military. Norwegian authorities even opened investigations into alleged illicit exports of sensitive electronics to Russia, underscoring their vigilance. Switzerland, for its part, announced in April 2025 an expansion of its controlled goods list to encompass emerging dual-use tech like quantum computing, advanced AI, and semiconductor tools – changes which took effect by May 1, 2025. By autumn, Swiss officials confirmed that export licensing for those cutting-edge categories was fully in force, in line with the country’s policy of “internationally harmonized” control lists. For Turkish defense and aviation companies that source European high-tech components, these European measures mean that certain items may now require licenses or face outright export denial. For example, a Turkish drone manufacturer seeking specialized Swedish or Swiss camera tech or a Norwegian composite material might encounter new barriers unless they provide assurances about end-use and end-user.
Asia-Pacific: Rising Barriers on Sensitive Tech Exports
Across the Asia-Pacific, key nations also tightened dual-use regulations in late 2025, reshaping export dynamics for strategic goods. China’s export control regime saw especially consequential changes in October. On October 9, 2025, Beijing implemented its most comprehensive export restrictions to date on critical minerals and technologies – dramatically expanding controls on the export of certain rare earth elements, materials, and related know-how. Five additional rare earth metals were brought under license controls, and dozens of pieces of rare-earth refining and processing technology were listed as restricted. China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) announced that foreign companies who use Chinese-origin rare earth materials must now comply with Chinese export licensing rules, even when shipping products from one overseas location to another. In effect, China asserted a form of extraterritorial oversight resembling a “re-export” control: for example, a company in Türkiye or Singapore re-exporting a magnet alloy containing Chinese dysprosium from its factory would need a MOFCOM license. These Chinese measures – unveiled abruptly ahead of a planned Trump–Xi presidential meeting – were widely seen as leverage in the US–China strategic tussle over tech supply chains.
Even more telling, MOFCOM concurrently introduced its own Chinese version of a “50% rule” for export licenses. Export license applications were to be presumptively denied if the importer or end-user is on China’s export control blacklist or watch list, including any of their overseas branches or subsidiaries with ≥50% ownership by a listed entity. This move mirrored the U.S. BIS affiliates rule and signaled Beijing’s willingness to respond symmetrically to Western restrictions. China essentially warned that companies it deems a security threat (and their affiliates) would find it difficult to obtain Chinese high-tech goods such as specialized electronics, drones, or rare earth materials. Additionally, MOFCOM declared a policy of rejecting license requests for exports of certain “critical goods” to blacklisted foreign companies and their majority-owned units. For Turkish businesses, China’s escalations have dual implications: those relying on Chinese inputs (like rare earth magnets for defense systems) must navigate new Chinese red tape, and any Turkish entity doing business with firms on China’s bad list could face Chinese supply cut-offs. The volatility was evident by late October – during economic talks in Malaysia, China agreed to delay full enforcement of its rare earth export bans by a year, while the US paused its affiliates rule, showing that these measures are bargaining chips in great-power diplomacy.
China also took steps to modernize its overall export licensing system. On September 16, 2025, MOFCOM published draft new Measures for the Administration of Export Licenses for Dual-Use Items, aiming to replace older regulations and streamline processes. Proposed changes include a strict “one license, one use” rule (eliminating the prior practice of using a single license for multiple shipments), extending controls to items sent abroad via mail or in personal luggage, and explicitly defining what constitutes an unauthorized export (e.g. any mismatch between license parameters and the actual item, end-use, or end-user). The draft also distinguishes minor license changes from major ones (changing an end-user or destination would suspend exports until a new license is approved) and moves the system to a fully digital platform for applications. Notably, the draft emphasizes catch-all controls, listing transactions that will need prior government approval – such as any exports involving certain chemicals, cryptographic products, or nuclear materials. Multinational firms in Türkiye dealing with Chinese dual-use goods (for instance, a chemical exporter or electronics supplier) should pay attention: once adopted, these rules will make China’s licensing more rigorous and potentially slower, affecting supply chain timelines. Companies will need to ensure their Chinese partners secure proper export permits and understand that even intangible technology transfers (e.g. sending technical blueprints to Turkey) could trigger Chinese licensing under the new regime.
Other Asian allies of the West also tightened controls. Japan implemented major updates to its export control regulations effective October 9, 2025, overhauling its “catch-all” controls to prevent sanction circumvention. The Japanese government reclassified high-risk dual-use items (like certain semiconductor equipment and machine tools) as “core items” subject to stricter scrutiny. Tokyo introduced a requirement that exporters must “know” the end-use and end-user for sensitive items going to any non-allied country (those outside Group A of trusted multilateral regime partners). If an exporter knows or has reason to suspect a conventional item might be used for weapons in a non-Group A country, they must seek a license. In parallel, Japan added an “informed” condition for even friendly destinations: if authorities inform an exporter of a concern (for example, a shipment to a European ally that might be diverted to Russia), the company must get a license despite the usual friendly status. These measures were a direct response to reports that some Japanese high-tech goods were reaching Russia via third countries. The practical impact for compliance teams is substantial – Japanese suppliers now demand far more documentation from buyers about final end-use, and diversion of Japanese components has become much harder. Turkish importers of Japanese-origin advanced machinery or electronics may experience more intensive screening or even occasional denials if Japanese regulators worry about onward proliferation.
South Korea likewise has been aligning with tightened export norms, although without a single headline reform in fall 2025. Seoul has kept in lockstep with the U.S. on restricting chip manufacturing equipment to China since 2023, and Korean authorities maintain a robust system controlling “Strategic Items” (dual-use goods) and “National Core Technologies.” By 2025, South Korea’s export control authority (under the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy) was closely monitoring re-exports and transit trade. There is growing enforcement of requirements that any export which might support weapons of mass destruction or military end-use – even if not explicitly listed – must get a “catch-all” license. Korea’s customs and intelligence units have been actively auditing companies for compliance red flags, especially those trading with Russia via intermediaries. The upshot is that Korean firms are exercising more caution in supplying complex electronics or materials to new customers. Turkish companies working with South Korean suppliers should expect detailed end-use questionnaires and possible delays as Korean exporters double-check that sales to Turkey won’t inadvertently route controlled tech to embargoed destinations.
Two major emerging economies in Asia, India and Vietnam, used this period to significantly upgrade their dual-use regulatory frameworks. In India, the Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) issued a sweeping revision of the SCOMET list (Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials, Equipment and Technologies) on September 23, 2025. This 2025 update introduced new categories and stricter controls to align India’s export rules with global regimes like the Missile Technology Control Regime and Australia Group, as well as to address cutting-edge tech. Most notably, India created a new SCOMET Category 7 for emerging technologies – bringing under control certain items beyond even the Wassenaar Arrangement’s list. For the first time, India explicitly listed advanced tech such as quantum computing systems with 34+ qubits, cryogenic CMOS circuits (for quantum use), and high-end semiconductor manufacturing tools (like next-generation lithography machines capable of 45 nm or below). Also added were controls on additive manufacturing equipment operating in a vacuum (key for aerospace components). Other SCOMET revisions broadened Category 6 to cover directed-energy weapon systems (laser and particle-beam weapons) and even sub-orbital spacecraft, reflecting modern military tech. Category 3 was updated to include automated peptide synthesizer machines (important for bio-weapon precursors), and Category 8 (which covers aerospace/propulsion) now captures certain advanced alloy powders made via ultrasonic atomization. These changes make India’s export rules far stricter – Indian exporters of high-tech now require permits for a range of items that were previously uncontrolled. For Türkiye, which has growing defense ties with India, this means any collaboration on sensitive tech or procurement of Indian specialized equipment will involve more compliance steps. Turkish companies will need to coordinate closely with Indian partners on license applications and be prepared for DGFT’s more exacting oversight.
In Vietnam, the government established an entirely new legal basis for strategic trade control. On October 10, 2025, Vietnam’s Decree No. 259/2025/ND-CP took effect, creating the country’s first comprehensive system to manage exports, re-exports, transshipments, and transit of strategic goods. This decree defines “strategic goods” to include weapons of mass destruction, conventional arms, and dual-use items that could contribute to WMD or military programs. It mandates that listed dual-use goods (detailed in an annex of the decree) require a government license for export or re-export out of Vietnam. Perhaps most critically, it introduces a “catch-all” clause: even if an item is not on the dual-use list, if there is suspicion it may be used for WMD development or if the foreign end-user is on a designated blacklist, the exporter must obtain a license. Vietnam’s Ministry of Industry and Trade (MOIT) is also empowered to impose licensing requirements ad hoc to fulfill international commitments – a flexible tool to, say, halt exports to certain countries if urged by partners. The decree encourages Vietnamese exporters to implement Internal Compliance Programs (ICPs) and offers those with a strong compliance record the possibility of facilitated licensing (such as longer validity licenses). For global companies, including those in Türkiye sourcing from Vietnam’s growing tech manufacturing sector, this development is significant. It means Vietnam is now actively policing sensitive trade flows – a likely condition as it deepens economic ties with the US and EU. Turkish importers of electronics or chemicals from Vietnam may now encounter Vietnamese export license formalities, and any attempt to route goods from Vietnam to embargoed destinations via Turkey will face greater odds of detection and denial.
Other Notable Jurisdictions: Israel, Singapore, New Zealand and UAE
Several other jurisdictions important to global supply chains also updated their dual-use controls, indirectly affecting Türkiye. In the Middle East, Israel’s Ministry of Economy and Industry announced updates to Israel’s Dual-Use Control List to incorporate changes from the Wassenaar Arrangement’s 2024 plenary. Effective October 1, 2025, Israel added numerous new entries paralleling those adopted by the EU and US – focusing on emerging dual-use technologies. Israeli exporters now face controls on items like advanced cyber surveillance tools, certain semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and quantum computing components that were not previously regulated. Israel traditionally updates its lists about nine months after Wassenaar decisions, giving industry time to adjust; the fall 2025 update was a major refresh ensuring Israeli export rules remain aligned with Western partners. For Türkiye, which has occasionally imported high-tech components from Israel or collaborated in aerospace (despite complex political ties, some trade in electronics/optics exists), Israel’s alignment with strict controls means fewer loopholes to obtain sensitive tech. Moreover, Israel’s emphasis on enforcement – its Export Control Agency actively monitors end-use – reinforces that Turkish companies must maintain strict compliance if they seek Israeli dual-use goods.
In Southeast Asia, Singapore – a major trading hub – updated its Strategic Goods Control List by issuing the Strategic Goods (Control) Order 2025. Gazetted on October 1, 2025 and scheduled to take effect December 1, 2025, this Order revokes the 2024 list and brings Singapore’s controls in line with the latest multilateral lists. The new list explicitly integrates changes from the 2024 Wassenaar Arrangement Munitions List and the 2024 EU dual-use list, ensuring Singapore’s coverage of dual-use items reflects current international standards. The update includes editorial clarifications and revisions for consistency, but substantively it means Singapore will control recently identified sensitive items (for example, advanced chip technologies and quantum-related goods) just as the US and EU do. While Singapore historically was a conduit for high-tech re-exports, it has tightened compliance, especially under pressure to prevent diversion of goods to Russia. Companies in Türkiye dealing with Singaporean suppliers should anticipate that any item on the updated list will require a proper Singapore export license – gone are the days of easy transshipment of borderline dual-use items through Singapore without oversight.
Similarly, New Zealand introduced new controls effective October 30, 2025. The government there updated the New Zealand Strategic Goods List to add national controls on certain dual-use technologies in categories such as Materials Processing, Electronics, and Computers. The move was described as targeting emerging dual-use tech – likely including things like machine tools for ultra-precision manufacturing, advanced electronic components, and high-performance computing items not fully covered by older lists. For example, industry reports suggest New Zealand may have added controls on some niche technologies like specialized metal fabrication equipment and encryption modules. Though New Zealand’s export volume in those items is limited, this change shows the broad consensus among Western allies (New Zealand is part of the multilateral export regimes) to plug any gaps in dual-use governance. It also means that Turkish firms seeking any specialized equipment from New Zealand (or partnering in R&D) will encounter the same licensing hurdles as they would in bigger countries.
One jurisdiction warranting particular mention is the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Though the UAE did not promulgate a new public export control list in late 2025, it has been under intense international pressure to clamp down on illicit re-exports of dual-use goods to Russia and Iran. During September and October, Western officials engaged closely with the UAE, sharing intelligence on Emirati trading companies channeling microelectronics and drones to Russia for use in Ukraine. In response, the UAE has been tightening enforcement quietly: revoking licenses of some local firms found violating sanctions, enhancing customs inspections for dual-use commodities, and issuing advisories to businesses about the penalties for sanctions evasion. Notably, the EU’s 12th and 13th Russia sanctions packages earlier in 2025 had identified several UAE companies as sanctions violators and imposed asset freezes, an embarrassment that Abu Dhabi has sought to address. By late 2025, the UAE was cooperating more openly with U.S. authorities to shut down rogue transshipment networks. For Türkiye, this matters because Turkish and Emirati trade has flourished, and some Turkish exporters use UAE free zones as logistics hubs. If the UAE is now actively intercepting dual-use goods (like chips, avionics, or special materials) bound for Russia via its ports, Turkish intermediaries involved in such routes could be exposed. Moreover, with the Gulf state increasing compliance, Turkish firms may need to provide UAE partners with more documentation to prove that any sensitive goods shipped through Dubai or Abu Dhabi are not destined for blacklisted end-users. In essence, the noose is tightening even in regions once seen as loopholes.
Implications for Türkiye’s Strategic Trade and Compliance Posture
This worldwide tightening of dual-use regulations directly challenges Türkiye’s defense and industrial base to adapt. As a participant in all major multilateral export control regimes (Wassenaar Arrangement, Missile Technology Control Regime, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australia Group), Türkiye is legally obligated to transpose updated control lists and to exercise vigilant oversight of sensitive exports. The Turkish Ministry of Trade – which oversees export control of dual-use and some military items – will need to ensure that Turkey’s national control list remains aligned with the new international benchmarks. In practice, this likely means Turkey will incorporate similar additions (quantum computing hardware, advanced semiconductor tools, AI-related chips, etc.) into its own controlled goods list if it hasn’t already. Turkish export authorities may issue communiqués or update the “Export Control Regime List” to capture these emerging technologies, so that Turkey honors its commitments and prevents itself from becoming a backdoor for restricted tech. Compliance officers in Turkey should be on the lookout for official bulletins from the Ministry of Trade or Turkey’s General Secretariat of Export Controls announcing such list updates, which could come by early 2026 as a follow-up to the Wassenaar 2024 changes.
Strategically, Türkiye must balance its trade relations amid these stricter controls. The country’s defense industry has thrived in part by importing high-tech components from the U.S. and Europe (such as aerospace-grade electronics, sensors, and materials) and by exporting finished drones, vehicles, and electronics globally. With Western nations now extremely cautious about diversion of dual-use items, Turkish companies will experience more intensive vetting when sourcing critical parts. For instance, a Turkish aerospace firm obtaining infrared cameras or jet engine parts from the UK or Canada might face additional questionnaires and longer license wait times given new caution about end-use (especially if any risk of those parts finding their way to embargoed states). Export control compliance is no longer a box-checking exercise; it has become a strategic function that Turkish firms must invest in. Companies should strengthen their internal compliance programs, ensuring rigorous screening of customers and end-users, and be prepared to provide end-use certificates or governmental assurances demanded by foreign suppliers. Those dealing with China or Russia need to be especially alert: under the U.S. BIS’s expanded rules, if a Turkish company is even partly owned by a sanctioned Russian or Chinese entity, U.S. exporters might halt shipments to it absent a license. Turkish firms will not want to find themselves unwittingly listed as a “red flag” affiliate under the new BIS guidance.
Türkiye’s own export policies will also face scrutiny. Turkish enforcement agencies are under pressure from Western allies to prevent the re-export of sanctioned goods to Russia through Turkey. The EU and U.S. have noted a surge in Turkish-Russian trade in dual-use-like items (electronics, chips, machinery) since 2022. Now, with the EU’s 19th sanctions package (October 2025) explicitly targeting third countries’ involvement, Turkey must demonstrate robust controls or risk diplomatic fallout. We may see the Turkish Ministry of Trade increase inspections and require Turkish exporters to Russia or Belarus to furnish more documentation proving the civilian end-use of their goods. Türkiye has a vested interest in not becoming isolated from Western supply chains: if it were perceived as a major sanctions leakage route, allies could respond with secondary measures (for example, the U.S. recently used tariffs on India for buying Russian oil – a warning that economic tools are on the table). To maintain its standing, Ankara is likely to quietly tighten its compliance oversight, even if it avoids publicly aligning with sanctions.
On the opportunity side, some global shifts could benefit Turkey’s industries. As the U.S. and EU restrict exports of advanced tech to China and Russia, Türkiye could become an alternative manufacturing hub or market for Western high-tech under proper safeguards. For example, if U.S. chip equipment can’t be sold to China, suppliers might turn to sell more to Turkey’s nascent electronics sector – but only if Turkey is viewed as a reliable end-user. By bolstering legal compliance and transparency in its strategic trade controls, Turkey can position itself as a trustworthy partner in global supply chains, attracting investment in sectors like semiconductor assembly, aerospace, and AI software that are now subject to tighter controls elsewhere. Turkish strategic industries (from defense aviation to telecommunications) should emphasize their commitment to export control compliance when dealing with foreign licensors or investors, reassuring them that cutting-edge technology will be safeguarded per international norms.
In summary, the flurry of dual-use regulation tightening worldwide in late 2025 presents a pivotal moment for Türkiye. Legally, Turkey must update its frameworks to meet new multilateral standards; operationally, Turkish companies must navigate a far more complex web of foreign rules when importing or exporting sensitive goods. The Turkish Ministry of Trade and related bodies will play a crucial role, issuing guidance to exporters and conducting outreach so that businesses understand new requirements (for instance, explaining U.S. BIS’s changes or EU list updates). Compliance professionals in Türkiye should treat this period as a wake-up call to double down on training, audits, and technology solutions for export controls. Those efforts will not only prevent legal violations but also protect Turkey’s access to the global high-tech marketplace. In an environment where phrases like “dual-use regulations” and “strategic export compliance” dominate policy discussions from Washington to Brussels to Beijing, Türkiye’s ability to respond effectively will influence its defense sector’s resilience and its reputation as a responsible trading nation. By proactively adjusting its strategic trade posture now, Türkiye can mitigate risks and even leverage the new global order to strengthen its own industrial base under compliant, secure conditions.
