U.S. FCPA Enforcement: Global anti-bribery enforcement remains intense, with the United States leading in actions and penalties. In 2024, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) brought a total of 38 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement actions, including 14 corporate cases and 24 individual prosecutions. Total fines exceeded $1.5\u202fbillion \u2013 the highest annual sum in five years \u2013 underscoring U.S. regulators\u2019 aggressive approach. Notably, many of the largest FCPA cases have targeted non-U.S. companies, highlighting the statute\u2019s global reach. For example, in 2024 Swiss commodity trader Gunvor paid nearly $475\u202fmillion in U.S. penalties to resolve bribery charges, and U.S. aerospace firm RTX (Raytheon) agreed to a $383\u202fmillion settlement over illicit payments related to Qatar. The U.S. continues to pursue hefty sanctions: eight of the ten biggest FCPA penalties ever have been against companies outside the U.S., and 2024\u2019s cases confirm this international focus. Even as a temporary White House-ordered \u201cpause\u201d<\/em> slowed new FCPA cases in early 2025, enforcement has since resumed with revised DOJ guidelines. The June 2025 DOJ guidance directs prosecutors to be more selective \u2013 prioritizing cases with clear harm to U.S. interests or national security and targeting individual wrongdoers \u2013 but without renouncing the FCPA\u2019s broad jurisdiction. In practice, this means U.S. authorities remain ready to act against corruption involving foreign companies when it impacts U.S. markets or competitors<\/em>, while coordinating with foreign regulators in other instances. Crucially for Turkish businesses, personal accountability is front and center: U.S. enforcement is not only levying corporate fines but prosecuting executives (24 individuals were charged in 2024 alone), with prison terms up to 5 years per bribery count under FCPA statutes and even higher under money laundering laws. The \u201cFCPA heat\u201d is therefore very real \u2013 non-U.S. firms and their officers can and do face U.S. indictments if bribes touch American jurisdiction (such as use of U.S. banks or stock exchanges).<\/p>\n\n\n\n UK Bribery Act and European Enforcement: Outside the U.S., enforcement of anti-bribery laws is intensifying. The UK\u2019s Serious Fraud Office (SFO) continues to pursue high-profile cases under the UK Bribery Act 2010 (UKBA). In April 2025, the SFO charged London-based United Insurance Brokers Ltd. (UIB) with the corporate offense of \u201cfailure to prevent bribery\u201d<\/em> \u2013 alleging UIB\u2019s agents paid about $3\u202fmillion in bribes to officials in Ecuador between 2013\u20132016 to win $38\u202fmillion in reinsurance contracts. This marks a significant Bribery Act prosecution that could for the first time<\/em> test in court whether a company had \u201cadequate procedures\u201d in place to prevent bribery. (Previously, all UKBA corporate cases settled without trial, so this UIB case may set a compliance benchmark.) The UK has also broadened its toolkit: a new \u201cfailure to prevent fraud\u201d corporate offense came into force in September 2025, applying to both UK and overseas companies that have a business presence in the UK. The SFO explicitly warned that \u201ctime is running short for corporations to get their house in order\u201d before it uses this law, signaling eagerness to aggressively hold companies accountable for economic crime. Meanwhile, British authorities have encouraged more self-reporting and cooperation, but also executed coordinated cross-border raids and investigations (for instance, the SFO\u2019s 2023 bribery probe into construction firm Blu-3<\/em> involved simultaneous searches in multiple countries).<\/p>\n\n\n\n OECD Convention Pressure and Global Actions: The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, now 25 years old, continues to pressure signatory countries to prosecute foreign bribery by their nationals. This peer pressure has driven legal reforms (e.g. the UK Bribery Act\u2019s passage in 2010) and major cases in countries like France, Germany, and Brazil. However, enforcement among the 46 signatories remains uneven. Transparency International\u2019s latest review found that by 2022 only 2 countries were \u201cactive\u201d enforcers of foreign bribery (down from 7 active enforcers in 2018), reflecting declines in prosecutions in countries such as Germany and Italy. On the other hand, a few states have ramped up efforts: France\u2019s financial prosecutor (PNF) has secured multiple corporate settlements (CJIPs) against multinationals, and countries like Switzerland and the Netherlands have penalized banks for enabling overseas bribery schemes. Importantly for T\u00fcrkiye, the OECD\u2019s Working Group on Bribery delivered a scathing Phase 4 evaluation in June 2024, finding that T\u00fcrkiye has not secured a single foreign bribery conviction since joining the Convention in 2000. Out of 23 known allegations involving Turkish companies or individuals, nearly two-thirds were never even investigated, and none<\/em> of the remainder led to charges. No Turkish company has been held liable for either<\/em> foreign or domestic bribery in the past 15 years. These findings prompted stern OECD recommendations and mark growing international impatience with Turkey\u2019s enforcement gap. The upshot is that Turkish businesses face a dual threat: on one side, robust foreign enforcement<\/em> (from the U.S., UK and others) targeting cross-border corruption, and on the other, mounting pressure on Turkish authorities<\/em> to start prosecuting such cases at home. In short, global \u201cFCPA heat\u201d and OECD scrutiny together create an environment in 2025 where no major company can assume bribery will go unnoticed or unpunished, even if local enforcement has been lenient historically.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Another indicator of Turkey\u2019s anti-corruption climate is the Corruption Perceptions Index. The most recent CPI (2024) score for T\u00fcrkiye is 34 out of 100, placing it well below the global average score of 43. In the 2024 CPI rankings, Turkey stood at 107th out of 180 countries. While this was a slight climb from 115th the year prior, Transparency International clarified that the movement was due to other countries\u2019 declines rather than any improvement in Turkey. In fact, Turkey\u2019s score of 34 remains the lowest the country has recorded since 2004, illustrating a long-term slide from a peak score of 50 in 2013. This poor CPI performance reflects persistent perceptions of high corruption in Turkey\u2019s public sector \u2013 an assessment echoed by the OECD\u2019s findings of weakened institutions and oversight. TI\u2019s analysis attributes Turkey\u2019s stagnation to \u201cthe absence of an independent and effective anti-corruption body, the weakening of oversight mechanisms and a lack of reforms\u201d<\/em>. Notably, among countries seeking EU membership, Turkey now ranks near the bottom in corruption control. For Turkish boards, the CPI serves as a red flag: investors and partners view Turkey as a high-corruption-risk jurisdiction, which in turn heightens scrutiny of Turkish companies\u2019 governance. In practical terms, a low CPI ranking can translate into less foreign investment and greater due diligence demands from counterparties. Boards should treat Turkey\u2019s CPI status as a call to action to bolster internal compliance \u2013 to not only improve the country\u2019s score over time but also to reassure global stakeholders that Turkish companies are actively managing corruption risks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Historically, industries like defense and energy have been regarded as high-risk for corruption in Turkey and emerging markets. Indeed, the OECD specifically warns of Turkey\u2019s \u201ccontinued expansion of companies in high-risk sectors such as defence and construction\u201d<\/em>. However, enforcement trends and recent scandals show corruption risk is spreading to other sectors \u2013 meaning Turkish firms beyond the usual defense\/energy sphere must be vigilant. In 2025, notable risk sectors include construction and infrastructure, healthcare and pharmaceuticals, fintech and financial services, and real estate:<\/p>\n\n\n\n In summary, Turkish companies can no longer confine anti-corruption efforts to defense and energy projects alone. Regulators and investigators (both domestic and foreign) are looking across the economy \u2013 from construction sites to hospital procurement, from digital finance platforms to real estate offices \u2013 for red flags of bribery and fraud. Boards in these sectors should reassess their risk maps, ensure industry-specific compliance guidance, and learn from recent scandals to preempt similar issues in their own operations. As enforcement broadens, any Turkish company in a government-facing or highly regulated sector must assume it could be the next target if controls are weak.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n While U.S. authorities have long dominated anti-corruption enforcement, the European Union and its member states are rapidly bolstering their own anti-bribery regimes \u2013 a trend with direct implications for Turkish businesses operating in Europe or with EU links. In 2025, Europe\u2019s enforcement environment is marked by new legislation, unprecedented cross-border collaboration, and a resolve to hold companies (and individuals) accountable across jurisdictions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n EU\u2019s New Anti\u2011Corruption Directive: In May 2023, the European Commission proposed a sweeping EU Anti-Corruption Directive, which by 2024 gained support in the European Parliament and Council and entered final trilogue negotiations. This directive (expected to be adopted in 2025) aims to harmonize anti-corruption laws across all 27 EU states, plugging gaps and raising standards. Key features include establishing common criminal offenses (with clear definitions of bribery, trading in influence, illicit enrichment, etc.) and requiring criminal liability for legal persons (companies) involved in corruption. Notably, the directive will oblige each member state to punish companies when a person in a \u201cleading position\u201d (e.g. a director or manager) engages in bribery for the company\u2019s benefit. This extends even to cases where lack of supervision enabled the offense \u2013 mirroring the UK \u201cfailure to prevent\u201d approach and ensuring corporates can be prosecuted independently of individual perpetrators. The directive also calls for stiffer penalties: EU countries would have to impose minimum prison sentences of 4\u20136 years for individuals convicted of serious corruption (up from current norms of 1\u20133 years) and consider banning corrupt individuals from holding office or directing companies. For companies, it mandates sanctions like fines, confiscation of profits, and debarment from public contracts Union-wide.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Perhaps most consequential is the directive\u2019s broad jurisdictional reach. Each EU member state must assert jurisdiction not only when offenses occur on its soil or involve its nationals, but also when a bribe is paid for the benefit of a company established in that member state<\/em>. In practice, this means a Turkish company with a subsidiary, branch, or significant operations in any EU country could be prosecuted in that country for bribery committed anywhere in the world, if the illicit conduct was intended to benefit the EU-based business. For example, if a Turkish construction firm\u2019s affiliate in Germany bribes an official in Africa to win a contract that the German affiliate will perform, German prosecutors would have clear authority to charge the company under the new directive. Many major EU economies (Germany, France, etc.) already have some extraterritorial provisions, but the directive will standardize and potentially expand these powers across the entire EU, creating a far more unified and formidable enforcement front. Turkish companies, especially those with EU subsidiaries, will need to comply not just with Turkish law but with EU-level standards \u2013 effectively exporting tougher OECD-grade rules into their operations. The directive is expected to be transposed into national laws within 3 years of adoption, so by the late 2020s we will see a new wave of European enforcement that could ensnare Turkish firms that have, until now, faced little legal risk at home.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Unprecedented Cross\u2011Border Cooperation: European agencies are also joining forces as never before. On 20 March 2025, an \u201cInternational Anti-Corruption Prosecutorial Taskforce\u201d was established by the prosecutors of France, the UK, and Switzerland \u2013 three leading jurisdictions for foreign bribery cases. This trilateral taskforce<\/em> is explicitly aimed at coordinating complex bribery investigations and sharing intelligence across borders. Its formation sends a strong message: as one official noted, it \u201creaffirms our collective commitment to tackling international bribery and corruption, wherever it occurs\u201d<\/em>. The taskforce\u2019s initial goals include a senior \u201cLeaders\u2019 Group\u201d to align strategy and a working group to propose joint investigative steps. Such formalized cooperation means, for instance, that a corruption case touching multiple jurisdictions (say, a scheme involving a French company paying bribes through Swiss banks to win a UK contract) can be jointly addressed rather than siloed. For Turkish companies, this European collaboration matters because many have ties to these jurisdictions \u2013 e.g. Turkish conglomerates raising funds in London, using Swiss private banks, or partnering with French firms. If a Turkish company is involved in a bribery scenario that one of these agencies is examining, the information will likely be shared among all three, even if U.S. enforcers are momentarily less active<\/em>. Indeed, this taskforce was launched just as the U.S. announced its FCPA enforcement \u201cpause,\u201d underlining that Europe is gearing up to fill any void. The message to corporates is unmistakable: an act of bribery might be pursued by the SFO, PNF, or Swiss OAG (or all in concert), regardless of U.S. action. This increases the odds that wrongdoing with a European nexus will face legal consequences, not escape in a jurisdictional gap. Beyond this trio, the European Union\u2019s agencies are also active: the new European Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office (EPPO) is up and running, investigating fraud and corruption involving EU funds among its 22 participating states (though Turkey is not one, EPPO can probe any misuse of EU money in Turkey). Furthermore, Europol and Eurojust facilitate multinational evidence gathering on corruption cases (for example, coordinating Italy, Romania, and others in recent procurement-fraud stings).<\/p>\n\n\n\n EU Regulations and Blacklists: In addition to the directive, the EU in 2023\u20132025 has been mulling a sanctions regime for serious corruption, akin to the Global Magnitsky sanctions the U.S. uses to freeze assets of corrupt actors worldwide. If enacted, this could see corrupt officials or even companies (including Turkish ones) blacklisted from travel to or banking in Europe. The EU has also implemented the Whistleblower Protection Directive, requiring robust whistleblower channels and anti-retaliation measures in all large companies operating in the EU. This is prompting subsidiaries of Turkish companies in Europe to establish hotlines and compliance reporting systems that meet EU standards \u2013 these systems in turn can surface corruption issues that might have stayed hidden. Additionally, new EU procurement rules put greater onus on excluding bidders implicated in corruption, which could impact Turkish contractors seeking EU-funded projects or contracts in EU countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Overall, the European enforcement landscape is rapidly evolving to be more assertive and coordinated, closing past loopholes. For Turkish boards, this means the \u201cEurope risk\u201d is more acute than ever. A Turkish company that in the past might worry mainly about U.S. FCPA exposure must now also consider UK prosecutions (if it has UK business), and the possibility of an EU member state or joint taskforce action (if any EU interest is at stake). European regulators have shown they will hold even foreign firms to account: for instance, France\u2019s PNF prosecuted Airbus<\/em> (a European company) in 2020 but also investigated Halliburton<\/em> and Panalpina<\/em> (U.S. and Swiss firms) in prior years; Switzerland has prosecuted Swiss banks for laundering foreign bribes (e.g. in the Petrobras scandal); and the UK has enforced global<\/em> settlements involving non-UK parent companies (like the Rolls-Royce DPA, which covered misconduct in multiple countries).<\/p>\n\n\n\n In practical terms, a Turkish construction or energy company with a subsidiary in the EU must anticipate that if a corruption issue arises, European regulators will coordinate and act. The company could face concurrent investigations in, say, Germany and France, plus queries from the EU Commission if EU development funds were involved. The days of playing one jurisdiction off another are ending \u2013 cooperation means evidence or whistleblower reports can quickly reach multiple enforcers. Turkish firms, therefore, need a \u201cFortress Europe\u201d compliance strategy: ensure any EU-facing operations meet the highest anti-corruption standards (e.g. following UK Ministry of Justice guidance or ISO 37001 frameworks), and be prepared to engage with European regulators transparently if an issue emerges. As EU scrutiny rises, companies that demonstrate proactive compliance and cooperation will be in a far better position than those caught unprepared.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The trends above carry several urgent lessons for Turkish boards, C-suites, and compliance officers. In essence, the anti-corruption enforcement net is tightening internationally, and it increasingly has extraterritorial<\/em> reach into Turkish companies and individuals. Decision-makers must recognize that corruption, once considered an \u201caccepted cost of doing business\u201d in certain markets, now exposes the company \u2013 and its leadership<\/em> \u2013 to serious legal and financial jeopardy across multiple jurisdictions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Extraterritorial Reach \u2013 No Safe Harbor: Perhaps the most critical point is that laws like the U.S. FCPA and UK Bribery Act apply worldwide, far beyond their borders. The FCPA can hook a Turkish company through surprisingly minimal U.S. connections \u2013 for example, if a bribe is paid in U.S. dollars through a U.S. correspondent bank, if a Turk Telekom executive emails a co-conspirator via a server in the U.S., or if a Turkish firm is listed on a U.S. exchange or has an American subsidiary. The U.S. has aggressively asserted jurisdiction in such scenarios, making no distinction between American and foreign offenders. In fact, 9 of the 10 largest FCPA enforcement penalties on record have been against non-U.S. companies (including giants from Brazil, Europe, and Asia), and those companies have paid multi-billion-dollar fines. The UK Bribery Act is similarly far-reaching: any company that \u201ccarries on a business or part of a business\u201d in the UK (even without a formal subsidiary) can be prosecuted for failing to prevent bribery anywhere in the world. This means if, say, a Turkish manufacturing firm has a UK sales office, and its agents bribe officials in another country, the SFO could charge the Turkish firm under UK law. With the upcoming EU directive, the entire EU<\/em> will have a comparable reach, as discussed. Additionally, other OECD countries like France, Canada, and Germany have been upping enforcement of their foreign bribery laws, which also capture acts by local companies overseas and, in some cases, acts by foreign companies on their soil. Turkish executives must dispel any notion that \u201cour laws aren\u2019t enforced, so we\u2019re safe\u201d \u2013 enforcers elsewhere will fill the void. Turkey\u2019s failure to punish foreign bribery at home actually increases the likelihood of foreign prosecutions, since U.S. and EU authorities are more inclined to step in when they see local impunity (DOJ\u2019s new guidelines explicitly consider whether a foreign country is willing and able to pursue the case; if not, the DOJ is more likely to act). The bottom line: Turkish companies are subject to a patchwork of potent anti-bribery laws that effectively cover the globe. Board members must map out where their company operates, sells, or holds assets, and assume that any corruption incident in those areas could trigger enforcement by at least one capable jurisdiction \u2013 be it the U.S., UK, an EU country, or even multilateral development banks (which debar firms for misconduct).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Corporate Liability \u2013 The Company Is on the Hook: Modern enforcement heavily emphasizes corporate liability, meaning regulators will not hesitate to hold the company itself responsible for employees\u2019 actions. The era of blaming a rogue employee is over \u2013 unless a firm can prove it had \u201cadequate procedures\u201d to prevent bribery (as a defense under UK law), the company will likely be held accountable. This has huge financial and reputational consequences: multi-million (even billion) dollar fines, compliance monitors imposed, and loss of contracts or financing. For Turkish boards, this means proactive compliance is not just ethical but fiduciary duty \u2013 protecting shareholder value by avoiding corporate indictments. Notably, Turkey\u2019s own laws technically allow corporate criminal liability for corruption, but enforcement has been nil (no company has been convicted in 15 years domestically). However, OECD pressure may change this. If Turkey amends its laws or invigorates prosecutors, companies could suddenly face local charges (the OECD recommends Turkey clarify corporate liability and start using it). Boards should prepare by treating Turkish anti-corruption law as if it were being enforced at OECD standards<\/em>, to avoid a rude awakening later. Moreover, global trends like the EU directive will force<\/em> Turkey\u2019s trading partners to demand higher compliance \u2013 e.g. an EU contractor might refuse to subcontract to a Turkish firm that lacks an anti-bribery program, for fear of liability. We also see corporate liability expanding into related areas: the UK\u2019s new failure-to-prevent-fraud law and similar \u201cfailure to prevent money laundering\u201d proposals indicate that companies will be expected to prevent a range of financial crimes or face punishment. Turkish executives should assume that any serious misconduct by their staff \u2013 bribery, fraud, bid-rigging, etc. \u2013 can lead to the corporation itself being prosecuted or blacklisted. This raises the stakes for robust internal controls, training, and a culture of integrity. The board\u2019s role in overseeing compliance is critical; regulators often ask if the board received regular anti-corruption reports, whether it empowered a compliance officer, and if it took action on red flags. A complacent board could be seen as complicit, whereas an engaged board that builds a compliance framework can protect the company or at least earn leniency if a violation occurs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Personal Liability \u2013 Executives in the Crosshairs: Enforcement agencies worldwide are increasingly holding individual executives and employees personally accountable for corruption. The days of negotiating only corporate settlements while individuals walk free are waning. The U.S. DOJ has re-emphasized that companies won\u2019t get full cooperation credit unless they give up culpable individuals, and the DOJ and SEC did charge individuals in FCPA cases in 2024 for the first time in several years. Senior managers have gone to prison for FCPA offenses (e.g. a former Alstom executive served years in U.S. prison for bribes in Indonesia). In Europe too, prosecutors target individuals alongside companies \u2013 e.g.<\/em> in the Unaoil case, the UK convicted multiple executives of bribery. For Turkish directors and officers, this means you personally could face criminal charges abroad if involved in a scheme. A CFO who falsifies books to hide bribes could be charged with both bribery and fraud by U.S. or EU authorities if they can establish jurisdiction. Even if you never set foot in the U.S., you could be tried in absentia<\/em> elsewhere or subject to an Interpol Red Notice limiting travel. Moreover, the consequences for individuals are growing tougher<\/em>: the proposed EU directive will require member states to impose minimum prison sentences of up to 4\u20136 years for corruption and to consider banning convicted individuals from executive positions. Many countries (including Turkey, under its 2020 law on public procurement) also allow blacklisting individuals and companies from government contracts if found guilty of corruption. Personal liability also extends to the boardroom through \u201cduty of oversight\u201d concepts \u2013 if boards knowingly ignore corruption red flags, they could face shareholder lawsuits or even charges (for instance, in some jurisdictions failing to prevent bribery can incur personal fines for directors). The recent Wirecard scandal<\/em> in Germany and others have prompted discussions on holding non-executive board members accountable if compliance systems are willfully deficient. Turkish board members should thus treat anti-corruption compliance as an integral part of their governance responsibilities \u2013 not only to protect the company, but to protect themselves. Ensuring a strong compliance program, demanding internal audits, and swiftly addressing any misconduct can shield executives from allegations that they were willfully blind or negligent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Changing Enforcement Priorities \u2013 What It Means for Strategy: The enforcement winds can shift with political changes (e.g. the Trump Administration\u2019s temporary FCPA pullback vs. Europe\u2019s surge). Companies must stay agile to these changes. For example, if the U.S. focuses FCPA cases on national security-related sectors (defense, critical minerals, etc.), a Turkish defense contractor might now face even higher<\/em> scrutiny, whereas a low-level facilitation payment in another sector might currently be deprioritized by DOJ. But that does not mean it\u2019s lawful \u2013 another country or a future U.S. administration could still act. The prudent course for boards is not to chase the lowest standard, but to adhere to the highest reasonable standard across all operations. Emphasize a zero-tolerance stance on bribery, even in regions where it\u2019s considered \u201cbusiness as usual,\u201d because enforcement can catch up unexpectedly. One should also note the rise of cross-border whistleblowing and media investigations (e.g. ICIJ leaks, investigative journalists exposing corruption). These often lead to enforcement even years later. Turkish leaders must foster a culture where issues are reported internally<\/em> and addressed, rather than hoping they stay hidden \u2013 otherwise they may be exposed externally, to far worse effect.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In summary, Turkish boards and executives must act now to adapt to this rigorous enforcement environment. No company is too \u201clocal\u201d to escape global anti-corruption laws, and no executive should assume they are beyond the reach of prosecutors. The costs \u2013 massive fines, jail time, loss of contracts, reputational ruin \u2013 are simply too high. On the positive side, those Turkish companies that proactively embrace strong compliance will not only avoid these pitfalls but also gain a competitive edge in international business (as clean, transparent partners). The next section provides concrete steps and best practices to achieve that.<\/p>\n\n\n\n To meet the 2025 global standards in anti-corruption compliance, Turkish companies should implement a comprehensive and up-to-date compliance program. This is not a box-ticking exercise, but a dynamic system tailored to the company\u2019s risks and aligned with international best practices (such as the U.S. DOJ Guidance, UK Ministry of Justice principles, and ISO 37001:2025). Below are key risk mitigation and compliance practices Turkish boards and management should prioritize:<\/p>\n\n\n\n By rigorously implementing the above practices, Turkish companies can meet the 2025 global compliance benchmark. This will not only mitigate enforcement risk but also yield positive business benefits: easier access to international capital (as lenders and investors increasingly require anti-bribery diligence), better relationships with multinational partners who demand compliance, and improved operational efficiency and reputation. As White & Case observed, even with the U.S. FCPA pause, \u201cother authorities remain willing and able to act\u2026 The message to corporates is that there are other sheriffs in town, so compliance regimes must operate effectively and be updated to deal with evolving risks.\u201d. In practical terms, this means Turkish boards must act now \u2013 if your compliance program hasn\u2019t been reviewed or refreshed in a few years, 2025 is the time to do it. Incorporate the latest guidance, address the new sector risks, and ensure your program would impress an OECD evaluator or DOJ prosecutor if scrutinized.<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s Latest Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) Score and Ranking<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Beyond Defense and Energy: New Sectoral Corruption Risks for Turkish Companies<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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Europe Steps Up Enforcement: EU Regulations, Cross\u2011Border Cooperation, and Impact on Turkish Companies<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Implications for Turkish Boards and Executives: Extraterritorial Laws, Corporate Liability & Personal Accountability<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Strengthening Compliance: Risk Mitigation Practices for 2025 and Beyond<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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